

## 5. DECISION DEMANDED:

## MOSCOW'S ILLUSORY VICTORY

The Berlin Declaration represented an effort to establish a common syndicalist policy to pursue in the RILU congress. But while the Declaration effectively anticipated the issues upon which syndicalists and communists would collide at the founding RILU congress, now postponed from May to July of 1921 to correspond with the third congress of the CI, the lack of more general agreement and resolve in Berlin betokened the lack of consensus among the various national syndicalist bodies concerning international policy. In none had this question been fully resolved in early 1921. That some organizations subscribing in whole or in part to the Berlin Declaration, such as the USI, the CNT, the CSR and the British Shop Stewards, were already pledged to Moscow further confused the issue. Moreover, the repressive environment endured by some syndicalists – governments sought to muzzle the USI and to hobble the CNT, which led only a clandestine existence at this time – made it difficult to discuss and appraise the international question thoroughly within their national organizations. Moscow, for its part, quickly indicated its attitude towards the Berlin conference and the Information Bureau it had appointed. Shortly after the conference Belinskii publicly assailed those participants most critical of Moscow, the Germans and the Swedes, as insignificant sectarians whose movements would soon disappear. In the conference he had castigated them as reformists, and assailed the Germans as counter-revolutionaries.<sup>1</sup> Where syndicalism survived in its “pure” form, he now wrote, it united “only miserable groups of fanatics and hermits.” Belinskii lamented the meeting’s affirmation of trade union autonomy. But he also noted with satisfaction that no step had been taken in Berlin toward establishing a syndicalist International and he applauded the decision to attend the RILU congress, confidently concluding that the conference constituted “the last convulsions of the old syndicalism.”<sup>2</sup> When the Syndicalist Information Bureau sought to communicate with the RILU Provisional Council it found itself ignored. In the absence of a greater demonstration of consensus in Berlin, which might have prompted it to be more conciliatory, the RILU Council preferred to deal with the syndicalist and industrialist organizations individually, adopting a policy of divide and conquer, rather than recognizing in any way the Bureau as their collective voice.

Yet the Bolsheviks were not entirely free to dictate to the syndicalists. The intensification of Bolshevik persecution of Russian libertarians in the period preceding the RILU assembly inevitably aroused suspicions. The mounting persecution, the betrayal and destruction of Makhno's anarchist army in the Ukraine, the brutal suppression of the Kronstadt rising, the silencing of a worker-oriented opposition within the Russian Communist Party itself, the partial re-introduction of capitalism under the New Economic Policy, these could only heighten critical resistance to the Bolsheviks at least in some quarters of the European syndicalist movement.

### The Russian Syndicalists Beleaguered

As the Bolshevik Revolution unfolded the Russian libertarians were compelled to select among several courses open to them. A small minority, such as the underground anarchists, adopted the path of uncompromising opposition expressed in unstinting criticism and terrorist tactics. Others came to support the Bolsheviks fully, either by simple conversion, or on the grounds that the defense of the Revolution remained the paramount consideration, requiring that ideological differences be set aside. Various libertarians adopted the course exemplified by Bill Shatov, earlier a member of the syndicalist *Golos Truda* group, who came to regard criticism as temporarily out of place and who ended by serving the Bolsheviks long and well, only to disappear in the great purge of the 1930's. A third position, that of a rough neutrality, eschewed armed resistance as contributing to counter-revolution, but also rejected open collaboration with the regime in favour of maintaining a critical posture and continuing revolutionary agitation.<sup>3</sup>

The Russian syndicalists by and large adopted the latter course. Even Alexander Schapiro, who proved more willing to work within the Soviet regime than most syndicalists, never followed Shatov into open collaboration, but actively sought to salvage and deepen the earlier libertarian character of the Revolution. Schapiro had returned to his homeland at the earliest opportunity to offer his assistance to the Revolution. He soon joined the editorial board of *Golos Truda*. With another London anarchist and Jewish labour activist who had returned to Russia, A. Kantor, Schapiro also apparently initiated a Yiddish language paper to promote the soviet system among Jewish workers. In 1918 a Commissariat for Jewish Affairs emerged within the larger Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, and Schapiro and Kantor were willing to transfer

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their efforts to it. There Schapiro helped to produce Yiddish periodicals that supported the soviets but were not specifically Bolshevik.<sup>4</sup> By 1920 he worked under Chicherin in the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs itself. His activities were consonant with the outlook of various non-Bolshevik revolutionaries who believed that the Revolution must be defended, but without surrendering their right to criticize and to seek to influence its direction. For while working for the Commissariat Schapiro also devoted his energies to the 'Golos Truda' publishing house and to the trade union movement. At some uncertain point he apparently held high office in the rail workers' union.<sup>5</sup> Testimony reportedly linked Schapiro in 1919 to the underground anarchists, though the authorities obviously discounted this information.<sup>6</sup> Both those who in 1920 were critics of the Bolsheviks, like Borghi, and those who supported them, like Rosmer and Serge, recalled the moderate and measured nature of Schapiro's criticisms of the regime.<sup>7</sup> But he never attempted to disguise or mute that criticism; a statement from him reproduced in the West by Souchy unequivocally indicted party dictatorship and its attendant centralization as dogmatic, mechanical and soulless.<sup>8</sup> As Bolshevik repression mounted in Russia, so did Schapiro's criticism: the publicity given to his opposition, particularly abroad, would eventually earn him imprisonment and deportation. By then the Russian syndicalist movement had been crushed.

Its supporters had initially and briefly hoped that Bolshevik goals were not too distant from their own. But as the genuine character of the regime began to emerge and the persecutions to intensify, the increasingly critical syndicalists desperately and tardily attempted to establish a more resilient organizational structure to counter the organized Bolshevik campaign directed against them in the factories and workshops. The most vocal and active were those who spoke through *Vol'nyi Golos Truda* and who had organized the All-Russian Confederation of Anarcho-Syndicalists (ARCAS) late in 1918. Prominent in the ARCAS Executive were such figures as G.P. Maximoff, Sergei Markus and Efim Iarchuk. The syndicalists paid for having sought so belatedly to organize, for the Bolsheviks, once in power, could turn the full apparatus of the state against them as against all their domestic opponents. *Vol'nyi Golos Truda* was banned. Repressive conditions made a third congress of the ARCAS planned for the spring of 1919 impossible. Although this did not elicit open resistance, the syndicalists grew more outspoken in their strictures of Bolshevik policy, thus earning greater attention from the Cheka, which frequently arrested their leaders.

Maximoff, for example, was taken into custody six times between 1919 and the spring of 1921, and harassed by numerous searches.<sup>9</sup>

Yet the syndicalists were undeterred. Their publishing house in Moscow continued under Schapiro's guidance to specialize in the works of western syndicalists and of Bakunin, and turned out the occasional bulletin.<sup>10</sup> They also pursued as best they could their organizational efforts. Though unable to expand their membership significantly they nevertheless scored some successes in their propaganda work and in their audacious anti-Bolshevik campaign. In the spring of 1920 the All-Russian Congress of Food-Industry Workers, in a resolution drafted by Maximoff and proposed by the ARCAS, condemned the Bolshevik regime as leading to a "total, unlimited and uncontrolled domination over the proletariat and the peasantry, to frightful centralism carried to the absurd, after having murdered everything in the country that was living and free and all spirit of independent initiative." The assembly characterized the proletarian dictatorship as "in reality a dictatorship of a party and even of a few individuals over the proletariat, a dictatorship applied through the most ferocious means, appropriate only to despotism." It indicted the iron discipline applied to labour and production, completely enslaving the proletariat, as unprecedented in the annals of human servitude.<sup>11</sup>

The persistent receptivity to such propaganda only reinforced the government's resolve to root it out. The Bolsheviks in fact regarded the syndicalists as constituting the greatest threat within the native libertarian movement. A circular from the party's Central Committee in the spring of 1921, detailing the need to restrict libertarian activities further, singled out the ARCAS as the most dangerous group. The Committee lamented not only the syndicalists' influence with the workers, but also their propagandizing in the Red Army, their efforts through the instructors' units of the adult education system and particularly their penetration of youth groups, especially those of the communists, which was creating an opposition within the party. It noted that the ARCAS refused to abandon its "revolutionary struggle against the Communists" or its advocacy of the general strike "even when applied toward the Soviet government. It recognizes only the free Soviets, possible only outside the framework of dictatorship." The Committee warned the party that of all libertarian organizations the activities of the ARCAS had "the most disintegrating" impact, particularly upon "the vacillating members of our own organization."<sup>12</sup>

The concern and hostility with which the highest Bolshevik leadership viewed the syndicalists rested not only on the latter's own activities but

on the fact that they shared many of the same ideas as the Workers' Opposition, both in comparison with the movement. In the Union, chief of the Labour, but before prior to 1917. Kollontai, who was the Workers' Opposition, were themselves deeply committed to the promise of a society managed by the workers, a bureaucracy and fought for and in part from the fact that as Kollontai pointed out, the communist program

Once the implementation began to disintegrate, began to ebb away, and the role of the workers for which the state of labour - the unions, themselves management, the centralized, hierarchical discipline to a not only accentuated direct and independent their own claims should manage of 1917, to the since, but to the five of its economic apparatus of the unions." The entire administrative economic unit.



on the fact that it found itself challenged by an internal party opposition that shared many of the syndicalists' views. As its name suggests the Workers' Opposition was the most conspicuously *ouvriériste* faction, both in composition and orientation, within the party. Its spokesmen were themselves workers who had built careers not as party officials, publicists or theorists, but as activists within the organized labour movement. It is true that Aleksandr Shliapnikov of the Metalworkers' Union, chief among them, had been appointed the first Commissar of Labour, but he was also that rarity in the party, a worker-Bolshevik prior to 1917. An exception was the ex-Menshevik intellectual Aleksandra Kollontai, who penned the fullest statement of the position of the Workers' Opposition. Its defenders were those within the party most deeply committed to the ideals of 1917 as a genuine workers' revolution, to the promises of radical workers' democracy, to an economy collectively managed by the workers themselves, to an end to an alien and stifling bureaucracy and external, coercive labour discipline. This they had fought for and this they now resisted abandoning. The opposition sprang in part from the "vacillation, inconsistencies, and direct deviations," as Kollontai put it, from the "class-consistent principles of the communist program."<sup>13</sup>

Once the immediate grounds for the imposition of 'War Communism' began to dissolve, once the threats of civil war and external enemies began to ebb in 1920, the issues of the reconstruction of the economy and the role of the trade unions came to the fore. That one of the factions, for which the conspicuous Trotsky spoke, advocated the militarization of labour - the elimination of the remaining independence of the trade unions, themselves to be transmuted into instruments of government management, the subjection of the whole of civilian labour to thoroughly centralized, hierarchical and bureaucratic control, the reduction of labour discipline to a military-like mechanism of command and obedience - only accentuated the insistence of the Workers' Opposition upon the direct and independent role of labour itself in the economy. To defend their own claim that the unions as autonomous labour organizations should manage the economy they could point not only to the ideals of 1917, to the judgment of various national trade union congresses since, but to the 1919 Russian Communist Party program itself. Point five of its economic program clearly declared that "the organizing apparatus of socialized industry must first of all rest upon the trade unions." The trade unions "must actually concentrate in their hands the entire administration of the whole public economy as a single economic unit." It added that

The participation of trade unions in the management of the economy and the attraction by them of the broad masses to this task are, moreover, the principal means of the struggle against bureaucratization in the economic apparatus of the Soviet government, and afford the opportunity of establishing a truly popular control over the results of production.<sup>14</sup>

The left unionists had failed to prevent the replacement of collective management in industry by one-man management, the hated specialists, formalized at the Ninth Party Congress in March 1920. Loyal party members, they agreed to uphold a decision they had opposed. The same congress, in which their program had been denounced as "syndicalist contraband,"<sup>15</sup> rejected Shliapnikov's proposal that independent realms of activity for the party, the government or soviets, and the unions, be allotted under a system of a separation of powers. But they continued to campaign for a greater voice for organized labour in the developing soviet system. In late 1920 and early 1921 the Workers' Opposition advocated a series of measures designed to promote workers' participation and counteract a burgeoning bureaucracy of officials and specialists, including a greater voice for factory committees, equalization of pay, occasional physical labour even for managers and officials, and a return to the principle of the election of officials, recallable by the unions. Their main point continued to be the orderly transfer of the administration of the economy to the unions, united nationally in a Congress of Producers or similar body. They also advocated the resurrection of greater democracy within the party itself, of greater internal criticism and debate.

Although Lenin would abandon his earlier support for Trotsky's militarization of labour, he had no sympathy for talk from the Workers' Opposition about the administration of the economy by the unions, which in his opinion smacked of syndicalism. "Syndicalism hands over to the mass of non-Party workers . . . the management of their industries," Lenin complained in a speech on 'The Party Crisis', "thereby making the Party superfluous."<sup>16</sup> For Lenin the workers' revolution depended upon the party; he would therefore oppose any dilution of party power, even if that required opposing the organized workers themselves. In January 1921 at the All-Russian Congress of Miners, Lenin demonstrated yet again how aberrant had been his celebration of workers' self-management in 1917 by shouting out a denunciation of it: "Does every worker know how to rule the country? Practical people know that these are fairy tales." By that measure Lenin's own *State and Revolution* was a sustained fairy tale. The management of the economy

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by the trade unions Lenin now dismissed as "syndicalist twaddle."<sup>17</sup> As for internal opposition, he urged his colleagues to "combat the syndicalist deviation which will kill the Party."<sup>18</sup> Confronted by any threat to the party's monopolization of power, even if from within by the most genuinely working class component of the party, Lenin would fall back on the indispensability of a tutelary elite, on the organizational sanctity of the 'vanguard of the proletariat' that he had developed nearly twenty years earlier. Not for Lenin the faith of the Workers' Opposition who invoked Marx's assertion that the creation " 'of communism can and will be the work of the toiling masses themselves'."<sup>19</sup> By the Tenth Party Congress of March 1921, Lenin had determined not merely to defeat but to destroy the Workers' Opposition. That the congress corresponded to the rising by the workers and sailors of Kronstadt against the Bolshevik regime reinforced Lenin's resolve to undermine support within the party for the Workers' Opposition, indeed, to end all organized dissent within it. Although the representatives of the Workers' Opposition faithfully supported the party's brutal suppression of the Kronstadt rising, the parallels between the protests of the insurgents against party dictatorship and their appeals for a return to workers' democracy, and the position of the Workers' Opposition, were painfully evident.

If the animosity of the leadership of the party and government toward the Workers' Opposition within the party grew in 1920-1921, this was all the more true of their hostility toward the independently organized syndicalists. Increasing Bolshevik severity left the syndicalists uncertain how to protest their persecution and fearful that the government would move against their last instrument of mass propaganda, their publishing outlet, which was receiving numerous requests for literature from many parts of Russia.<sup>20</sup> They had personally apprized syndicalist delegates to the 1920 CI congress of their circumstances and entrusted documents to them for publication abroad. But they believed they could do more when Alfred Rosmer, who had remained at Moscow after the congress, called upon Schapiro at the 'Golos Truda' printing house, where they discussed the relationship of the syndicalists to the regime and especially to the communist party, and the syndicalists' concern to protect their publishing activity. Although he supported the Bolsheviks and had been elevated to the Executive of the CI, Rosmer retained considerable international prestige in syndicalist circles and some sympathy for the more recalcitrant syndicalists. The Russians therefore saw in him a sincere advocate of their case. They expected little from a protest they had already drafted for the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party,<sup>21</sup> but one lodged with the CI itself, they hoped, might serve not

only to reduce persecution and to offset the threat of an overall ban on their propaganda activities, but also to call into question the pro-Bolshevik sympathies of many of their foreign counterparts, which they considered of even greater urgency. Rosmer, who agreed to submit to the CI Executive a syndicalist declaration, believed an accord could easily be reached and "anticipated with delight an understanding that would have felicitous effects in the syndicalist movement in every country."<sup>22</sup> Rosmer erred in his optimism, however, for he had miscalculated both the tenacity of the syndicalists and the willingness of the Bolsheviks to reach a negotiated understanding. Surprised and dismayed by the defiant tone of the ARCAS document, Rosmer refused to submit it to the CI unless it were rewritten, its attacks on the communist party omitted, its polemical tone abandoned. Maximoff and Iarchuk reluctantly agreed to redraft the statement.<sup>23</sup>

Before a new document could be prepared the situation had changed dramatically. The Bolsheviks had been pursuing a very changeable policy towards the Ukrainian peasant anarchist army headed by Nestor Makhno, enlisting its aid in the civil war when necessary and attempting to crush the movement when possible. Despite these chameleon tactics (which included sending Cheka agents to assassinate Makhno, Trotsky's outlawing of the *Makhnovtsy*, and months of Bolshevik-*Makhnovtsy* armed conflict), Makhno again proved willing to join forces with the Red Army against Wrangel's Crimean offensive in the autumn of 1920. As a condition of his cooperation, Makhno stipulated an amnesty for all anarchist prisoners and full freedom of libertarian propaganda short of advocacy of the violent overthrow of the Bolshevik regime. The Bolsheviks agreed. A few imprisoned anarchists such as Voline, who had been engaged in educational and cultural work in the Ukraine under Makhno's aegis, were freed and resumed their activities, including preparation for a congress to be held in Kharkov. But the agreement and the respite it offered the libertarians were of short duration. A month later, Wrangel's offensive broken, the Bolsheviks immediately turned upon the *Makhnovtsy*. Makhno's military leaders in the Crimea, who had just shared victory with the Red Army, were seized and summarily slain, while Trotsky ordered his troops to attack Makhno's Ukrainian headquarters. At the same time the government raided libertarian organizations throughout the country and the Cheka arrested the delegates, including Iarchuk, assembled in Kharkov for the anarchist congress.

In the light of these events, Maximoff, the only member of the ARCAS Executive then at liberty, drew up a new statement for Rosmer. The

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new draft questioned the disparity between the CI's professed desire to work with the syndicalists of Europe and communist persecution of those of Russia. The relentless terrorist tactics of the Russian Communist Party had rendered the circumstances of the native libertarians "incompatible with the honor of the Comintern."<sup>24</sup> But Rosmer, who found the statement even more sharply expressed than the original, categorically refused to submit it to the CI without substantial revisions in form and content. Seeing no alternative and still eager to get a statement before the CI, the syndicalists consented. Eventually Rosmer submitted to the CI Executive a milder version, drafted by Maximoff and by Schapiro and others of the 'Golos Truda' group.

Around the same time one of the ARCAS documents entrusted to the delegates to the 1920 CI congress appeared in the West. Published in *Le Libertaire* in January 1921, it urged western workers to undermine western intervention in the Russian civil war. The Russian syndicalists declared that although they were persecuted by a party dictatorship that was destroying "the country's spirit of initiative and its creative power," they ardently appealed for help in Russia's struggle against world capitalism. But they also issued a warning: "*Do not repeat* our mistake, do not introduce state communism. . . . Down with the bourgeoisie and the State, including the proletarian State."<sup>25</sup>

In Russia the last vestiges of open dissent, even within the Russian Communist Party, were disappearing early in 1921. Moscow witnessed a strange spectacle in February on the occasion of Kropotkin's funeral: the last public anarchist demonstration to be permitted in Russia. The government chose not to block, but merely to monitor the procession, which drew 20,000 marchers, and the speeches that commemorated Kropotkin. What made the proceedings bizarre was that most anarchist leaders were in prison and over a half-dozen of them, including some of the chief participants in the day's events, had to be released to attend, but only after promising the Bolsheviks that they would return immediately to captivity.

Rosmer notified the syndicalists in February that the CI Executive, having considered their statement, would return to the question at its next meeting, to which a representative of the ARCAS would be invited. But the curtailment of their publishing activities that the syndicalists had feared was already underway. Uneasy about the continuing appeal of syndicalist propaganda, early in 1921 Lenin proscribed the works of Fernand Pelloutier and some of those of Kropotkin and Bakunin.<sup>26</sup> The meeting between the ARCAS and the CI Executive, moreover, never occurred. Early in March mounting unrest in the Petrograd area flared



into insurrection at Kronstadt. The libertarian character of the rebels' demands<sup>27</sup> reinforced the Bolsheviks' urge to move against anarchists and syndicalists everywhere. Simultaneously with the brutal suppression of the Kronstadt rising, the Cheka initiated mass arrests of libertarians throughout the country. Maximoff and the only recently released Iarchuk were again arrested, and the bookstores of 'Golos Truda' in Moscow and Petrograd, as well as its printing plant, were locked up. To the syndicalists, the arbitrary arrests of their leaders in the spring of 1921 constituted the Bolshevik reply to the declaration they had submitted to the CI.<sup>28</sup>

The Bolshevik leadership also acted to end all organized dissent within the party. The Tenth Party Congress, underway when the Kronstadt revolt broke out, not only overwhelmingly rejected the platform of the Workers' Opposition, but introduced a ban on all factions within the party. All pretense of internal party democracy was abandoned. The congress also introduced the New Economic Policy, a retreat toward capitalism that made important market concessions to small traders and manufacturers, above all to the peasantry. Lenin believed the introduction of a mixed economy to be a tactical expedient made necessary by the chaos that the civil war and the accompanying policies of war communism had induced. To some foreign revolutionaries the Bolsheviks appeared not only to have introduced a political dictatorship in Russia, finalized by the actions of the Tenth Congress against even internal party dissent, but to have utilized this dictatorship to capitulate to the requirements of international capitalism by reintegrating Russia into some version of the capitalist system.

### Moscow Bound

Although solidarity with the Russian Revolution remained the watchword for the great majority of western syndicalists as the first RILU congress approached, evidence of the increasingly autocratic nature of the Bolshevik regime, exemplified not least by its persecution of the Russian syndicalists, caused considerable disquiet. Western syndicalist organizations, especially those nearest to Russia, had obviously not been unaware of the repression directed against their Russian comrades, but had generally refrained from reacting publicly while the Russian Revolution struggled for survival against the perils of civil war and a western blockade. The repression had reached such a pitch in the spring of 1921, however, that some groups believed it impossible to

remain silent any longer. The Bureau began to act. In May a protest was organized against the government, the Trade Unions, the Trade Union of RILU, and signed by the Anarcho-Syndicalists. Alexander Berkman announced that he would take more action. He reached Moscow in June.

Reservations were expressed in Germany, where the better informed workers' movements. Some of the working class in Germany.<sup>31</sup> The workers, moreover, had been in the advance of most of the dictatorship of the proletariat as early as its beginning. Their participation in the workers' opposition to the affairs of the state had appealed to the workers specifically urged a delegation.<sup>32</sup> The workers in March 1921 endorsed a resolution that imprisoned in Russia a delegation (which included a number of other workers) some urged that the Berlin Declaration be attended.<sup>33</sup> In the participation.<sup>34</sup> The workers of hosting a delegation of their severest criticism, the failure of the Berlin Declaration in December 1920, opponents with

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remain silent any longer. At the end of April the International Syndicalist Bureau began to canvass syndicalist organizations on the question.<sup>29</sup> In May a protest against the persecutions directed to Lenin, the Russian government, the Russian Communist Party, the All-Russian Trade Unions, the Third International and the Provisional Council of the RILU, and signed among others by Schapiro for the 'Golos Truda' Anarcho-Syndicalist League and Markus for the ARCAS, and by Alexander Berkman and Emma Goldman, appeared in the West.<sup>30</sup> The issue would take more dramatic form once the foreign syndicalist delegates reached Moscow.

Reservations regarding Moscow were nowhere more evident than in Germany, where geographical proximity kept the members of the FAUD better informed than their more distant colleagues on Russian developments. Souchy's lengthy and critical study of the conditions of the working class under the Soviet regime appeared early in 1921 in Germany.<sup>31</sup> The early emergence of an active domestic communist party, moreover, had led to conflict between syndicalists and communists in advance of most other European countries. The FAUD had rejected the dictatorship of the proletariat and collaboration with the communists as early as its 1919 congress. Many within it opposed any kind of participation in the Moscow meeting; recent events in Russia intensified their opposition. Some also resented the interference of the RILU in the affairs of the FAUD. The RILU's newspaper in Germany had appealed to the syndicalists to dispatch representatives to Russia, but specifically urged them to include neither Rocker nor Kater in such a delegation.<sup>32</sup> The FAUD convened an extraordinary national conference in March 1921 to deal with the international question. The assembly endorsed a resolution demanding the release of anarcho-syndicalists imprisoned in Russia. Although it also selected a tentative RILU congress delegation (which included Rocker, but to which Kater, Souchy and a number of other leading figures declined nomination), and although some urged that the Germans join their foreign comrades in supporting the Berlin Declaration, no clear consensus could be established over attendance.<sup>33</sup> In a subsequent poll of its membership, the FAUD rejected participation.<sup>34</sup> The decision spared the Bolsheviks the embarrassment of hosting a delegation from an organization that had become one of their severest critics. Although democratically endorsed by its membership, the failure of the FAUD to comply with the decision taken in Berlin in December 1920 to attend the RILU congress provided its opponents with a polemical weapon against the organization.

The question of participation also reverberated through the Dutch

NAS. The Berlin conference catapulted the issue of the proposed RILU into vocal and prominent controversy in which the NAS delegates to Berlin, Bouwman and Lansink Jr., were the most conspicuous protagonists. Prior to the conference the issue had been relatively subdued, though signs of a potentially divisive debate had already occurred within the NAS Executive itself. As in Germany, in The Netherlands the early communist party perceived a correspondence of interest and commitment between itself and the revolutionary unionists. Already in 1918 the communist party had urged its members to enter the NAS; some NAS unionists, conversely, were early members of the party. The presence of a considerable number of communist activists within the NAS ensured that its international policy would become a lively issue. By October 1920, in discussions of the upcoming Berlin conference, to which the NAS had decided to send Bouwman and Lansink, a variety of views had emerged within the NAS Executive. Bouwman clearly favoured the RILU in Moscow as alone capable of uniting all revolutionary trade unions, an objective which he believed the syndicalists could not achieve, while Kok insisted that the NAS's commitment to decentralization required that it work towards a syndicalist International. Lansink Jr. took the intermediate position that the NAS could unite with Moscow, "despite minor points of difference," if the RILU sought to become a genuinely independent International. The Executive resolved that at both the Berlin and Moscow meetings, the NAS should advocate a single autonomous revolutionary International.<sup>35</sup> But before the Berlin conference convened the Rotterdam metalworkers protested to the NAS Executive against sending Bouwman, a well-known communist militant, to represent the NAS in Berlin, and one of his fellow NAS Executives, Kok, pointed out that if Bouwman accepted the views of the Third International he could not honour the independence of his union organization.<sup>36</sup>

Following the Berlin conference the international issue quickly transcended the confines of the NAS Executive meetings. Shortly after his return Bouwman commended the conference as an advance for the pro-Moscow revolutionary unionists. Defending Belinskii throughout, he publicly assailed the German and Swedish delegations for insisting upon a strict interpretation of an independent labour International and for their opposition to dictatorship. "To say that one is against the dictatorship and the violence of the State," Bouwman wrote, "is to confess that one lacks the courage to accept the logical consequence of the revolutionary struggle of the working class."<sup>37</sup> His article triggered a lengthy debate that dominated the pages of *De Arbeid*. When the question

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of financing a delegation to Moscow arose some NAS Executives proposed, against Bouwman's objections, cancelling the NAS's participation. The Executive decided to send three instead of five delegates.<sup>38</sup> Purportedly made on merely financial grounds, the decision in fact symbolized the mounting hostility towards Moscow of Bernard Lansink Jr. and van den Berg, who withdrew from the delegation. A week later Lansink belatedly urged the NAS to propose that the RILU congress be held not in Moscow but in Copenhagen or Christiania; a few weeks later he pointed out that the acceptance of the editorship of the RILU's Dutch periodical by Thomas Dissel, a NAS Executive and designated RILU delegate, appeared to conflict with Dissel's ostensible commitment to an independent trade union movement. In April Dissel himself noted that a number of the newspapers of affiliated labour federations were campaigning against sending any NAS deputation to Moscow.<sup>39</sup>

The pro-RILU faction did not dominate the NAS Executive, but the question of international allegiance had become a profoundly controversial one and the NAS, purportedly an independent labour organization, had to deal with the phenomenon of communist penetration very early and at the highest level. August Rousseau, a member of its Executive, observed as early as March 1921 that the pro-Moscow campaign might end by splitting the NAS.<sup>40</sup> The future would tell. For the moment, their refusal to join the NAS delegation to Moscow brought down upon van den Berg and Lansink an attack by the RILU Council itself. Addressing the workers of the NAS, the Council denounced Lansink, the chief official of the NAS and Secretary of the International Syndicalist Bureau, as an opportunist. Along with van den Berg and their supporters he had sabotaged the decision of the Berlin conference and betrayed the syndicalist movement.<sup>41</sup> Lansink's and van den Berg's boycott proved counterproductive, for it left the pro-RILU outlook of the remaining NAS delegates without counterweight. Consequently, those dispatched to Moscow - Bouwman, Dissel and Cornelis Kitsz - viewed the RILU more favourably than did either the general membership or the Executive of the organization they represented.

In Italy as in Spain the major syndicalist organization had affiliated with the CI. Although the Secretary of the USI, Armando Borghi, had found his experiences in Russia deeply disturbing and had refused to sign the RILU Council's documents, the USI nevertheless announced its intention to join the RILU following his return.<sup>42</sup> The full extent of Borghi's disillusionment in Russia he expressed only to a few close colleagues, preferring to postpone this issue since the attention of the USI upon his return remained rivetted almost exclusively to the factory

occupation movement. The USI, the most recalcitrant organization involved, opposed attempts to negotiate an end to the occupation. Borghi's adamant criticism of the settlement engineered by the government and the CGL and his protests on behalf of political prisoners alarmed the government, which soon arrested and imprisoned him. If Borghi's behavior displeased the established powers in Italy, his earlier conduct in Moscow had also dismayed the leaders of the CI. Though eager to capture the USI, they obviously considered its ideology in need of correction, particularly following Borghi's unmistakably critical attitude in Russia. Within a month of Borghi's imprisonment, Zinoviev, writing publicly to the Italian socialist Serrati, commended the revolutionary spirit of the USI, but dismissed its leadership as confused. An open letter to the Italian working class followed, signed by Zinoviev, Bukharin and Lenin, which again attacked the leadership of the USI which thousands of revolutionary workers followed "*by mistake or by ignorance.*" The authors recommended the CI's systematic revolutionary approach, which included "a constant propaganda among the labouring masses who are oriented toward syndicalism and anarchism *in order to throw light on their mistakes.*"<sup>43</sup> These attacks did nothing to improve the relationship between the USI and Moscow. Exhausted by the struggle of the occupations and with its Secretary in jail, the USI had been unable to send a delegate to the Berlin conference that followed shortly after Zinoviev's attacks upon its leadership. USI spokesmen nevertheless welcomed this evidence of syndicalist resistance to Moscow and endorsed the decisions of the conference, which were incorporated into the USI's mandate to its RILU delegation.<sup>44</sup> In the absence of the still incarcerated Borghi the USI dispatched Nicolo Vecchi, who had directed the syndicalist factory occupation in Verona, and Lulio Mari to represent it. The USI Executive would have reason to regret these choices, for whatever their attitudes before leaving Italy, events would demonstrate that at Moscow neither delegate could resist the Bolsheviks.

Circumstances in Spain prevented any open and thorough discussion of the question of the international affiliation of the CNT. The *cenetistas* were locked in fierce and simultaneous combat with their rivals in the 'free' unions, the employers and the government. The organizational structure of the CNT reeled under this combined onslaught. Severe government repression had driven the CNT underground and nearly the whole of its surviving leadership languished in prisons. Since the CNT had already affiliated with the CI, its delegate to the 1920 congress had worked, albeit half-heartedly, with the RILU Provisional Council. Pestaña's reservations were such that while on his way home he had

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paused in Germany to cooperate in planning the Berlin conference. His critical views toward Moscow were not widely known in Spain prior to the RILU congress, however, for he had been immediately incarcerated upon his return. Imprisoned for many months, he did not begin to publish the report of his Russian experiences until the autumn of 1921. Pestaña's long silence is presumably attributable not only to his detention, but to the daunting task of challenging the almost unlimited enthusiasm for Moscow among many *cenetistas*. Rudolf Rocker observed that Pestaña had been "frightfully depressed" in Berlin following his return from Moscow, where he had gone with high anticipation and from where he returned as from "a shipwreck." What most heavily oppressed him was the question how to inform his fellow *cenetistas* of the true state of affairs. "It is almost like murder," Pestaña lamented to Rocker, "to destroy hopes that were so intense and that especially in Spain found such a powerful response, because we believed that the Russian Revolution was the signal for our own liberation."<sup>45</sup>

Among the most enthusiastic in the CNT were those who came to be known as the communist-syndicalists. They had not only joyfully welcomed the Bolshevik Revolution, like the great majority of *cenetistas*, but perceived at least some of the organizational principles of Bolshevism more accurately and in large part accepted them. Hilario Arlandis had already been urging centralization within the CNT as early as its 1919 congress. Some of the most important of the communist-syndicalists, such as Andrés Nin and Joaquin Maurin, both with backgrounds as teachers and journalists, were newcomers carried into the CNT by their identification with the Bolshevik Revolution and their perception of the revolutionary ethos of the syndicalist organization. As such they were largely unburdened by the ideological legacy of more long-standing *cenetista* activists and would eventually prove unfettered in their willingness to embrace an ideology at variance with the traditional dictums of the CNT. Although this attitude was not widely shared in the CNT, within which the communist-syndicalists were a small minority, some of them were rapidly ascending in an individual capacity within the organization. The uncritical popular enthusiasm for the Russian Revolution bolstered their efforts. More importantly, the virtual vacuum created at the leadership level by the wholesale imprisonment of established *cenetista* chiefs enabled the most active of the new figures quickly to move into prestigious positions. The rise of Nin and Maurin was meteoric. The suppression of *Solidaridad Obrera* had left *Lucha Social* as the main CNT journal in Catalonia. The principal communist-syndicalist organ, it was published in Lerida and edited by Maurin,

who by the spring of 1921 had become the most prominent member of the illegal committee of the Catalanian Regional Confederation. By then Nin had become the acting General Secretary of the clandestine CNT National Committee.

The communist-syndicalist minority, moreover, determined the composition of the CNT delegation to the RILU congress. Although state repression had prevented the disorganized CNT from sending a delegate to the Berlin conference, it had signalled its support by post. Now, apparently more by chance than design, the majority of the representatives attending a secret plenum of the CNT in April 1921 in Barcelona were communist-syndicalists. The four-member delegation came entirely from their ranks. It included Nin of the National Committee as well as Maurin, Arlandis and Jesus Ibañez of the Catalanian, Levantine and Asturian Regional Confederations respectively. At the initiative of Arlandis, who thought the more specifically libertarian should have some representation, Gaston Leval later joined the delegation on behalf of the Federation of Anarchist Groups. The antimilitarist Leval, whose real name was Pierre Pillar, had been active among the anarchists of Barcelona since 1914, when he had fled France to avoid army service.<sup>46</sup> The unrepresentative character of the Barcelona meeting soon came under criticism from other *cenetistas* who, complaining that the regional confederations had been selectively invited, challenged it as having been rigged, though its composition appears to have been the fortuitous result of the chaotic circumstances in which the CNT was operating.<sup>47</sup> In any event the mandate formulated at the plenum clearly instructed the delegates to combat any attempt to subordinate the unions at the RILU congress.<sup>48</sup> The communist-syndicalists accepted the mandate at the time, but their enthusiasm for Moscow and their revolutionary pragmatism would lead them to interpret it very broadly in the RILU congress. During the congress the Spanish communist-syndicalists in fact endeared themselves to Rosmer, who had been set the task of defending the Bolshevik position on the relationship between the RILU and the CI. Pleasantly surprised to find that the Spanish delegates, except Leval, shared his views, Rosmer described them as a "great comfort" to him.<sup>49</sup> That Rosmer felt in need of consolation was in large part due to the French delegation, whose composition he found far less satisfactory.

Although the French delegates to the Berlin conference had been enthusiastically pro-Moscow, those most eager for affiliation with the RILU among the *minoritaires* by no means monopolized the selection of CSR delegates to be sent to Russia. The decisions of the Comintern congress of 1920, and the increasing evidence of party dictatorship and

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of government persecution of libertarians in Russia, had weakened the originally unqualified support for Moscow that had united the disparate supporters of the CSR. *Le Libertaire*, an early supporter, had gradually been transformed into a sharp critic of the Bolshevik masters of the Russian Revolution and of communist internationalism. At the end of 1920, moreover, the long struggles within the socialist party reached their climax when a majority voted at the congress of Tours to found the *Parti Communiste Français*. The emergence of the PCF, however, further complicated and confused the environment in which the *minoritaires* moved, rather than clarifying it, for the party remained initially indecisive and timid in its trade union policies. Some noted *minoritaires*, such as the metalworkers Georges Verdier and A. Quinton, devoted supporters of syndical autonomy, initially joined it, while others resolutely opposed it. Others still, reflecting the traditions of labour in France, remained skeptical of the party's revolutionary potential, among them some of Moscow's most enthusiastic partisans.

Finally, although the staunchest of the RILU supporters in the CSR had been spared the first-hand reports of the vanished Lepetit and Vergeat regarding their experiences in Russia, they eventually and unexpectedly confronted in the mysterious carpenter, Wilkens, one who could speak from direct experience and who did so critically and forcefully. Mandated by Spanish workers in northern France, Wilkens, like Lepetit and Vergeat, had shown less interest in the formal procedures of the second CI congress than in travelling widely and investigating conditions in Russia, to which he devoted six months. When he began to report his experiences back in France in workers' meetings and the press, his testimony proved to be acutely embarrassing to some within the CSR. That the most pro-Moscow of the *minoritaires* began almost immediately and desperately casting about for a way to discredit Wilkens, suggests that they found him to be a damaging witness.<sup>50</sup> They did so for a number of reasons. First, it was difficult to dismiss Wilkens as impossibly prejudiced in advance, for he had gone to Russia as a convinced Marxist and been converted by his experiences there to anarchism.<sup>51</sup> Second, he could report that he had been imprisoned for over five weeks in Russia, and the incarceration of a foreign delegate hardly constituted a credit to the fair-mindedness or even the revolutionary judiciousness of the Bolsheviks.<sup>52</sup> Third, Wilkens had managed to get some significant documentation out of Russia. Thus it was Wilkens who made the above mentioned ARCAS statement available in the West, as well, apparently, as an appeal regarding repression that members of the Russian Anarchist Black Cross, including Schapiro, had directed to the syndicalist delegates

in Moscow in 1920. When challenged regarding his report of his imprisonment in Russia, moreover, Wilkens produced documentary evidence to substantiate it.<sup>53</sup> Fourth, Wilkens had carefully collected information during his travels in the land of revolution, which strengthened the long series of critical articles he wrote on the situation in Russia.<sup>54</sup>

Wilkens's articles and reports were by no means decisive in undermining the unity of the CSR, but they do stand both as minor cause and major symptom of a gradual transformation within the organization. While the pro-Moscow forces within the CSR were increasingly uncertain and disoriented, those most devoted to defending syndical independence were growing in strength and also growing progressively more critical of Moscow. This shift is most clearly symbolized by the installment in May 1921 of Pierre Besnard, following Monatte's resignation, as Secretary of the Central Committee of the CSR. A union activist and militant railwayman who had lost his position as a result of the rail strike of May 1920, Besnard emphatically defended the unions from any form of political subordination. The presence of two additional libertarians, Quinton and Fargues, greatly strengthened Besnard's hand in the Central Committee. The initially uncritical support for Moscow that had once bound together the divergent elements within the CSR, in short, had begun to waver; the large delegation dispatched to Moscow reflected the heterogeneous composition of the *minoritaire* movement. Rosmer and the Bolsheviks could count on some willing collaborators within it, such as Godonnèche and Tommasi. But it included others, such as Sirolle, Jean Gaudeaux and Michel Relenk, who resolutely opposed any attempt to subject the unions to political control. Rosmer, in Russia since 1920 and now wedded to the policies that the Bolsheviks wished the RILU to incorporate, privately charged that this trio had come "not as friends of the Russians but as adversaries."<sup>55</sup> He was presumably unaware at this time that in February 1921 all three, along with over a dozen others, had signed a secret *Pacte*, of which Besnard was a chief architect, dedicated to preserving the CSR (and the CGT if and when conquered) from all political tutelage.<sup>56</sup> But there were yet others, Albert and Claudine Lemoine, Labonne and Gaye, in the French delegation, which as a whole had been instructed to oppose any attempt to politicize the RILU. The great majority of the delegation took the defense of its mandate - "its ridiculous mandate," as Rosmer complained - as imperative; they consequently constituted a thorn in the side of the Bolsheviks and a source of despair to Rosmer.<sup>57</sup>

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represented by personal delegates in the Berlin conference of 1920, sent delegations to the RILU congress. The three-man SAC delegation included Frans Severin, the Swedish representative in Berlin, while Tom Barker again represented the Argentinian FORA. The IWW, represented by Hardy in Berlin, dispatched George Williams to Moscow, although there had been some opposition in its 1921 congress to sending any delegate at all.<sup>58</sup>

The issues that promised to prove most contentious in Moscow were precisely those that had been most fiercely contested in the sessions of the RILU Provisional Council the year before: namely, those of working within the reformist unions and of the connection between the unions and national communist parties. The latter issue, cast on the international level, presented itself as that of the relationship between the proposed RILU and the CI, and became symbolic of the wider differences dividing syndicalists and communists.

Although the Bolsheviks had been slow to develop a clear position on the trade union question, the policy they finally adopted contrasted sharply with their policy toward workers' parties. Eager schismatics when it came to parties, the Bolsheviks embraced quite another tack regarding labour unions. Whereas they had insisted upon the necessity of leftist elements withdrawing from the old socialist parties and purging themselves of all opportunist elements, so that only the most dedicated and disciplined remained in the new communist parties, they condemned any effort to apply a similar policy within the union movement. This appeared to them to be a logical corollary of their conception of the party as the *avant-garde* of the revolution. As the "most advanced, most class-conscious, and hence most revolutionary part" of the working class,<sup>59</sup> the party constituted the spearhead of the revolution; as such, it had to be purified, to be fashioned of unalloyed metal. But the spearhead was of little value without the shaft; the party could not function properly without close contact with the masses. The chief arena of this contact was within the labour movement and above all within the trade unions. Consequently the Bolsheviks, political schismatics *par excellence*, became great advocates of labour unity. They condemned the tactic of withdrawal from reformist unions as simultaneously isolating the revolutionary workers from the masses, and leaving the more pliable majority in the hands of reformist union leaders. The Bolsheviks urged instead a policy of remaining within the reformist unions and seeking to transform them by the tactic of revolutionary cell-building, ultimately to capture the masses of workers by appropriating existing organizational structures and bringing them under revolutionary tutelage.



To many syndicalists and industrialists, however, precisely the impossibility of progressing within the reformist organizations had made the formation of their own revolutionary unions necessary. To the syndicalists the conduct of the reformist unions during the war had demonstrated yet again the futility of hoping they could be prompted to do more than espouse revolutionary rhetoric. In many cases the reformist organizations were among the most bitter adversaries of the syndicalists. To work within such organizations could only corrupt the fighting spirit of the revolutionary workers. So far from being in "the vanguard of progress," as the IWW's *Industrial Solidarity* later put it, "the permeators are the shock troops of retrogression."<sup>60</sup> The syndicalists and industrialists had long denied that a political party could ever constitute the *avant-garde* of the revolution. If such an *avant-garde* existed it could be found among the revolutionary workers themselves. To ask them to lose themselves in the reformist unions was equivalent to asking the communist parties to dissolve and send their members into the opportunist parties. In their quest for ideological hegemony over the whole of the revolutionary movement, the communists never fully appreciated the magnitude of the ideological sacrifice they expected the syndicalists and industrialists to perform so readily.

Ideally the Bolsheviks sought unity of outlook and action between communist-dominated unions and communist parties everywhere. On the international level, this goal entailed not a separate trade union International, but a single Communist International of which the revolutionary unions would merely form one branch. The statutes of the CI promulgated in 1920 clearly embodied this ideal by referring unambiguously to the international trade union organization as a mere section of the Comintern, and by directing the revolutionary unions to secure representation therein through their national communist parties.<sup>61</sup> Only belated recognition of the impossibility of securing widespread union support for such a scheme induced the Bolsheviks to initiate measures to establish a separate international body, in which to unite revolutionary unions, and with which to appease defenders of syndical autonomy. This was the task of the RILU Provisional Council, which called for a separate trade union International. But a separate organization did not, for the Bolsheviks, entail autonomy. The scheme of the Provisional Council called for a labour international to work jointly and in strict harmony with the CI, as well as for an exchange of representatives between the Council and the CI Executive. Prior to the RILU congress, the CI Executive declared it the task of the Comintern, and not the RILU, to determine the status of the latter, to decide whether

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it should be a mere section of the CI, or whether the unions should be organized in a parallel body "with the Comintern as the leading organization."<sup>62</sup> In contrast, the mandates of the various syndicalist and industrialist delegates expressly instructed them to oppose any efforts to subordinate the unions or to politicize the RILU; to struggle, in the words of the Berlin Declaration, for a trade union International wholly independent of every political party.

### **Bound to Moscow?: The RILU Congress**

Before the communists and revolutionary unionists could come into conflict on these substantive issues when the RILU congress opened in July 1921, they clashed on procedural points. The Bolsheviks had no intention of permitting an effective opposition to develop within the congress. They ensured that they and their sympathisers constituted a large voting majority by controlling both the distribution of votes and the work of the credentials committee. By these means the Bolsheviks added to their own large block vote (represented by the Russian trade unions and those of satellite states such as the Ukraine) hand-picked delegates said to represent the miniscule revolutionary labour movements of such places as Korea and Palestine. They further manipulated the electoral balance by admitting sympathetic delegates who represented minorities of major reformist unions, and by apportioning votes according to the number of unionists these delegates claimed to represent. Of the sixteen votes allotted to Germany, for example, eleven went to pro-Bolshevik delegates said to represent the minority of the German *Freie Gewerkschaften*, affiliated with Amsterdam, while only five went to independent revolutionary union organizations. Similarly, the IWW, once considered by the Bolsheviks as the only revolutionary labour organization in the United States, received only three of the sixteen American votes, the remainder being allocated to assorted largely pro-Moscow delegates with dubious credentials.<sup>63</sup> On the other hand, prior to the congress Gordon Cascaden of Canada was repeatedly questioned - cross-examined he believed - on his views on trade union-communist party relations, only to find himself denied a deliberative vote when it opened.<sup>64</sup> Protests lodged with the credentials committee rarely did any good. By these techniques the Bolsheviks emasculated the voting strength of their opponents. "The credentials committee decided the

course of the whole Congress," the IWW delegate later declared. "Everything was cut and dried. As for the delegates from revolutionary labour bodies who attended, they might better have stayed home."<sup>65</sup> Dismayed by these procedures, a number of delegates joined the Spanish delegation in formally protesting the allocation of votes to questionable minorities, as well as to obscure and dubious labour movements in such places as Bukhara and Java. This had created a "fictitious" majority "to frustrate the truly revolutionary tendencies of international syndicalism," and to ensure results that many of the workers of the West could not accept. Had votes been apportioned on the basis of the past and present conduct of legitimate labour organizations, the protest asserted, the genuinely revolutionary syndicalist organizations of the West could rightfully make their influence felt in the congress.<sup>66</sup> But the artificially enhanced pro-Bolshevik majority readily dismissed the protest.

The opposition proved no more successful when the congress reached more substantive issues. The minority was not only crippled in advance by the voting system, for its own divisions further reduced its effectiveness. The communists, moreover, strove assiduously to woo the delegations of the larger syndicalist organizations, especially those of Spain, Italy and France, though the French largely resisted these overtures. Despite the various means employed to ensure results compatible with Bolshevik goals, the opposition remained sufficiently forceful to turn the sessions into scenes of bitter struggle. The communiqués sent from Moscow by the communists tried to mask the fierce dissent within the congress. Far more accurate were the recollections of the British communist, Harry Pollitt. "What battles were fought at that Congress!" Pollitt wrote.

Coats were flung off, arms waved in the wildest gesticulations, hard names flew all over the place while discussion on the first draft program went on. . . . Several delegates raised stormy protests against politics being allowed in the trade unions at all. One felt that at any moment the speakers would resort to blows.<sup>67</sup>

The question of the relationship of the RILU to the CI triggered many of these scenes. While the Bolsheviks insisted that the RILU work in strict liaison with the CI, the syndicalists decried this integral connection as incompatible with syndical autonomy. Early in the congress, Aleksandr Lozovskii, the man charged with implementing Bolshevik international trade union policy, had sought to undermine the syndicalist position by bluntly declaring that "this theory of autonomy and of independence should be condemned by our congress. . . . Politics is a concentration of the economy and it is necessary for the

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class struggle; moreover, in a general way all class struggle is a political struggle." Any attempt to return to the position of the *Charte d'Amiens* was "incontestably reactionary."<sup>68</sup> Lozovskii may not have been the ideal candidate to tutor decidedly class-conscious syndicalists and industrialists on trade union policy. Drawn from a middle class family of professionals, he had never experienced manual labour and his entire trade union exposure consisted of two years as a union Secretary in France before the war. Lozovskii combined great industry with his talents of the pen and podium, but those who got to know him better than as a mere speaker – even the most pro-Moscow of the delegates, for example – found it difficult to take him seriously. He cultivated the image of the sophisticate, spoke didactically and looked, as Victor Serge put it, like a "slightly fastidious schoolmaster."<sup>69</sup> And yet the Bolsheviks had selected Lozovskii to represent Moscow in the international trade union movement, in part perhaps because he had extensive experience in the West and in a number of European languages, a knowledge he delighted in displaying, more importantly perhaps because he was uncommonly zealous in the Bolshevik cause, as well he might be as a very recent convert from Menshevism. At any rate, the main burden of persuading the syndicalists to accept the Bolshevik program intimately linking the RILU to the CI fell not to Lozovskii, but to Rosmer and Tom Mann. The Bolsheviks had originally intended Zinoviev, the head of the CI, to share this task with Rosmer. Sensing a chilly reception from the syndicalist delegates, however, Zinoviev abruptly abandoned his plans to participate,<sup>70</sup> whereupon the Bolsheviks selected Mann to assist Rosmer. The choices were shrewd, for the esteem which the two men carried within the international syndicalist movement could only enhance their appeals for a marriage between the syndical and political Internationals. They nevertheless faced a daunting task.

Rosmer argued that the Third International, like the First and unlike the Second, had been designed to unite both parties and unions. The entry of the USI and the CNT into the CI, he maintained, indicated that the syndicalists had no objections on principle to the coexistence of political and labour bodies in the same International. But the CI had decided to establish a labour International to unite not only those workers' organizations fully in accord with the program of the Comintern, but also those accepting only its essential principles. The relationship between the RILU and the CI was therefore not a theoretical issue, according to Rosmer, but only a question of practical organization, though it did raise other problems, notably that concerning relations between trade unions and political parties. On this point the Bolsheviks

had been much misunderstood. The Russian communists, despite the view widely disseminated outside Russia, had never held that the unions should be subordinated in any way to the communist party. The communists strove just as naturally and legitimately as any other party or group to exercise a predominant influence in the unions, but never to subordinate them.<sup>71</sup>

Traditional syndicalism had been equally misunderstood, Rosmer maintained. The *Charte d'Amiens* had not sought to guarantee the political neutrality of the CGT. Historically the *Charte* sought to keep the CGT on a revolutionary course, and had been directed against those within it who would either have had the CGT pursue a reformist trade union policy or tie itself to the opportunistic socialist party. The CGT had never been politically neutral, for it had followed its own course of revolutionary politics. "In reality, before the war the CGT had been a true political party, but of an entirely original and special form."<sup>72</sup> The CGT had declared its independence from political parties in 1906, Rosmer argued, because no revolutionary party then existed. The establishment of communist parties had radically altered the situation, though not all syndicalists had yet realized it. The CSR in France had, however, for it had declared itself willing to cooperate with a truly revolutionary party. Thus the *Charte d'Amiens*, properly understood and interpreted, constituted no barrier to collaboration between the unions and the party.

According to Rosmer, the problem on the international level was therefore simply that of determining the appropriate form of relating the two revolutionary Internationals, to which there could be no objection on principle. Fears that direct and permanent links between them would subordinate the labour International only belied a lack of confidence in the RILU. As a powerful organization in its own right it could never become a mere instrument of the CI. To clinch the argument, Rosmer declared the notion of the RILU's dependency upon the CI to be the propaganda ploy of the IFTU, itself linked to the Second International. Reverting to a favourite formula of Moscow's, Rosmer insisted that the entire issue reduced to a simple decision: the choice between Amsterdam and Moscow. The RILU Council had already been operating for a year and the CI had never sought to encroach upon its authority. To invoke union autonomy against the linkage of the RILU to the CI was to succumb to bourgeois machinations to keep the revolutionary unions and parties separate and mutually hostile. Against an increasingly organized bourgeoisie the proletariat must methodically assemble and organize its forces. In accepting a formal

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connection between the RILU and the CI, Rosmer concluded, the workers were doing no more than that; the question of syndical subordination did not enter into it.

Mann, in seconding Rosmer, justified his support of formal relations between the RILU and the CI precisely on the basis of his anti-parliamentarism. As a syndicalist, Mann asserted, he had long opposed workers' parties because of their reliance upon parliamentary action. He had always sought to demonstrate to workers that their problems were preeminently economic in nature and best resolved by direct economic action. But he had also been willing to learn from experience, to adjust his opinions to changing facts. The circumstances of economic and political life, he maintained, had greatly altered since before the war, and dictated a modification of attitude towards forms of workers' organization. Convinced more than ever that parliamentarism in no way alleviated the situation of the workers, he would be duty bound to reject the CI if it accepted parliamentarism in this sense. But he had always allowed one exception to his opposition to parliamentary activity; namely, "when one enters parliament in order to destroy it." This was the position of the CI, which did not concern itself with palliatives. Since the RILU sought the destruction of the capitalist state, Mann declared, he accepted completely the cooperation of the two Internationals in the manner of Rosmer's proposal.<sup>73</sup>

Speaking for the opposition, Williams of the IWW, Barker of the FORA, Arlandis of the CNT, Sirolle of the French delegation, and Mayer and Bartels of independent German unions, argued that the revolutionary unions and the RILU could and should stand alone; to sanction the interference of political parties in the industrial movement was a course fraught with danger. They cited the example of France as demonstrating that the unions were far more revolutionary than the communist party. What guarantee existed that the CI would not become as reformist as other political organizations? The minority fiercely defended both the independence of the union movement from national communist parties and the autonomy of the RILU.

Various speakers, including Murphy of Britain and Tsyperovich and Lozovskii of Russia, denied that the intimate link between the CI and the RILU constituted any threat to union autonomy. Lozovskii took advantage of his rebuttal to assail the Berlin conference for having presented its Declaration "as a Bible which the RILU congress must accept."<sup>74</sup> He submitted its theses, "the commandments of the syndicalist Testament," to acrid criticism. Lozovskii dismissed the expression 'the power of the working class' endorsed in Berlin as either equivalent to

the dictatorship of the proletariat or an empty phrase. Defining politics as "nothing other than the active opposition of one class to another," he rejected the separation of economic and political action as nonsensical. Syndicalist thought remained fundamentally flawed by its inability to discern "the politics of the economy." Lozovskii reserved his greatest wrath for the fifth thesis, requiring the complete independence of a trade union International from all political organizations. It displayed "an absolute ignorance of the most elementary truths of the class struggle." Its sinister purpose, Lozovskii averred, was to preclude the possibility of cooperation with Moscow.<sup>75</sup>

Even those syndicalists inclined to support the Bolsheviks were dismayed by their increasingly pontifical manner. Bouwman of the NAS had amply demonstrated his leanings toward Moscow during and after the Berlin conference. He nevertheless now cautioned the assembly not to react to the syndicalists in general and the Berlin assembly in particular in an excessively doctrinaire manner. While he believed the RILU should recognize the "spiritual leadership" of the CI, he considered it a mistake to accept the proposed RILU statutes without a critique. Observing that the assembly's failure to respond intelligently to the Berlin conference might lead to the formation of an independent syndicalist International, Bouwman warned the Bolsheviks against treating their own views "as a dogma."<sup>76</sup>

A number of representatives, including French, Spanish, and German delegates, had earlier proposed adjournment of this explosive question until the third CI congress, meeting simultaneously with the RILU congress, had considered the trade union question. This, they argued, would enable the RILU delegates to judge the true intentions of the CI. Their opponents, quickly turning this suggestion against them, observed that to await the decision of the political parties in the CI was a curious request from non-political syndicalists. They insisted that the fact that the RILU assembly could discuss issues separately corroborated its independence. A last-minute attempt by the German dissidents to postpone the vote on the resolution on RILU-CI relations failed.<sup>77</sup>

The Bolshevik-sponsored resolution easily won approval, despite the protests and a counter-proposal from the minority. The assembly thus declared that the logic of the class struggle "establishes the necessity of close contact and of an organic connection between the various forms of the revolutionary labour movement, and above all between the Communist International and the Red International of Labour Unions," adding that "it is also highly desirable that every effort be made at

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the national level towards the establishment of similar relations between the communist parties and the Red trade unions."Depicting the CI as the "avant-garde of the revolutionary labour movement in the entire world," the congress insisted that it be united to the RILU by "the closest possible bonds," by links of "an organic and technical character," based upon the common deliberations of the two bodies and upon reciprocal representation between their executive organs. It further affirmed the necessity of a "close and real connection" between the revolutionary unions and the communist parties in applying the joint decisions of the RILU and the CI.<sup>78</sup> A counter-proposal from Albert Lemoine of the French delegation affirmed the unqualified independence of the RILU and its refusal to acknowledge the CI as its "moral leader." It urged continuing efforts to ensure an effective liaison between the RILU and CI, but in a form subordinating neither to the other. The proposal gained a majority of the French vote and support from a number of independent German unions, the FORA, the NAS, the IWW and the SAC.<sup>79</sup>

Although the composition and organization of the congress precluded the failure of the Bolshevik view, the large majority by which the resolution on RILU-CI relations passed, 285 to 35, required the support of a number of syndicalist delegates. The French, for example, were split, with Tommasi defending and Sirolle opposing the Bolshevik resolution in the main debates. Tommasi and Godonnèche signed it. So too did Nin and Maurin of the Spanish delegation, which at the last moment embraced the Bolshevik proposal.<sup>80</sup>

The remainder of the official work of the congress constituted a systematic affirmation of Bolshevik policy. Minority objections were repeatedly swept aside. In the committee dealing with workers' control the CNT delegate challenged the enshrinement of the communist party as the inescapable vanguard of the revolution. The Spaniard, citing national differences, maintained that only in some countries would the party inevitably provide the initiative. In Spain, with large revolutionary unions and a miniscule and divided communist party, the syndicalists should maintain the revolutionary lead. "We do not ask that only the . . . syndicalists be the revolutionary vanguard; what we request is that it not be stipulated that it will be exclusively the communist party. . . . We call for a collaboration of all revolutionary forces, but raise our voices against all exclusivism."<sup>81</sup> The amendment was crushed in committee. The policy of working within reformist unions also won approval, though a dissenting statement was read in the congress endorsed by the CNT, the USI, the NAS, the IWW, the FORA, the

CGT-M, the FORU, by five German unions, by members of the French delegation, by Gordon Cascaden of Canada and others.<sup>82</sup> Despite this show of mass dissent, Lozovskii later dismissed the opposition on this issue as "a few mischief-making souls who seek theoretical forms for their pessimism and their powerlessness."<sup>83</sup> The congress endorsed the dictatorship of the proletariat repeatedly. A statement sharply condemned the "errors" of trade union neutrality and independence, pronouncing it the duty of the unions to struggle "against the ideology of neutralism" and insisting upon an "organic link" between the unions and the communist parties. The RILU statutes formalized this linkage on the international level by directing the Central Committee of the RILU to send representatives to the Executive Committee of the CI and to organize combined sessions and joint actions with it.<sup>84</sup>

### The Opposition in Disarray

Under the circumstances the minority could only hope to weld together a unified opposition to put its position as strongly as possible. In this it failed. The minority proved indecisive, ambiguous in purpose, and faulty in organization. Many members of what may loosely be called the opposition found themselves, like Buridan's ass, torn between conflicting objectives. The appeal of the proletarian revolution in Russia remained strong. The communists strove assiduously, moreover, to woo the delegates of the larger syndicalist bodies. The dissidents valued labour unity and hoped that all revolutionary unions could be united in a single labour International. At the same time they sought to defend syndical autonomy against the centralizing imperatives of the Bolsheviks, who demanded that the RILU fall into step behind the CI and that the unions embrace the repugnant policy of collaboration with communist parties. For some delegates the threat to their own organizations from the reformist unions, which they were being asked to join, further embittered the issue. The confusion into which developments had thrown them found expression in a series of conflicting statements that the minority began to formulate as the congress neared its end.

Internal divisions within the opposition precluded a uniform expression of dissent. The Bolsheviks were prepared to tolerate the milder forms of dissent for their own purposes. One statement declared that although the syndicalists had been overwhelmed in the congress, they were nevertheless united to the majority by a common revolutionary fire and faith in the proletariat. They were not satisfied with all the

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congress decisions and spoke of "new mutual concessions" as necessary, as if there had already been significant mutual concessions. But at that point the expression of dissent ended. The signatories exhorted all syndicalists to remain in the RILU. Only within the RILU, itself "formed in the revolutionary furnace of the Communist International," can "your autonomy . . . be preserved and your independence ensured." That the declaration amounted to 'sanctioned' dissent is evident from its content, from the absence of any criticism of the dubious representation in the congress, and from the fact that it bore the signatures not only of Nin, Mari, Sirolle, Bouwman, and others, but of such staunch pro-Bolsheviks as Mann and George Andreytchine - both elevated to the RILU Executive. The essentially protreptic document quickly found its way into Bolshevik publications.<sup>85</sup>

The less pliant opposition in the assembly, and even some of the signatories of the preceding statement, found themselves compelled by the unshakeable Bolshevik control of the congress sessions to hold a series of clandestine counter-meetings in hotel rooms at night. There various delegates from Germany, Holland, Scandinavia, France, Italy, Spain, South America, the United States and Canada groped for a common response to the policies being imposed upon the congress. The delegates of the independent German unions first acted to unite the dissidents. The Germans challenged the allocation of votes in the congress, which permitted cell groups from reformist unions to dominate autonomous labour organizations within the RILU. They urged the dissidents to unite in mutual defense in the event that the RILU leadership took disciplinary measures against them, and declared the aim of the opposition to be to convert the "fictitious" RILU "into a real International and to fight against all reformist, opportunist and other tendencies inimical to the movement, and to provide for its practical revolutionary character." In the interests of labour unity the Germans recommended that every effort to work within the RILU be exhausted before considering the possibility of a second revolutionary International. Their circular reached the hands of an enraged Lozovskii who read it, as one delegate put it, as though it were "the height of treason to indulge in such views."<sup>86</sup>

The assembled dissidents, however, never reached the desired common ground. Their clandestine sessions were made difficult by language problems. The attempt to unite the opposition came late, moreover, with only two meetings held before the conclusion of the congress and several thereafter. By then the delegates were beginning to leave Moscow. The Spanish and Italian delegations (the USI delegates had arrived late



and missed most of the congress) stipulated in joining the dissidents that they endorsed an opposition only within the RILU. Bartells of the *Allgemeine Arbeiter Union Deutschlands*, on the other hand, argued that an external Information Bureau should be formed for those organizations unable to join the RILU. Nearly all agreed on the need to publicize a clear opposition statement abroad to counter the unduly harmonious picture of accord that the Bolsheviks were communicating to the outside world, but Williams believed it urgent that a unified opposition resolution also be presented within the congress itself. The Dutch delegates curiously declared that since they were uncertain whether the NAS would join the RILU, they could not associate with the opposition. They nevertheless proposed that the Berlin Declaration be used as the basis for any opposition statement, though this suggestion did not win unanimous approval.<sup>87</sup>

The RILU policy of permeating existing reformist unions proved to be the major obstacle to the unity of the minority. The opposition was united in seeking a revolutionary labour International free of political influence. The congress had not required the dissolution of the French CSR and the Spanish CNT, and its attitude toward the Italian USI remained ambiguous.<sup>88</sup> Consequently the delegates of these, the largest syndicalist organizations, were content to build an internal opposition to work for the autonomy of the RILU. Those of the smaller radical organizations, on the other hand, confronted the demand to disband their unions. The Germans lamented the command "that revolutionary organizations dig their own grave." These delegates were therefore more inclined to renounce the RILU on the grounds of its political domination and to appeal for a separate International, or at least an organized external opposition. Williams of the IWW took this position. The delegates of the SAC, which had earlier appealed for a syndicalist International in the Berlin conference, also supported it. The Germans and others were inclined to support it as well. The position of these delegates was determined, in William's words, "by more than a mere consideration of affiliation with a political party, but also from a standpoint of self-preservation." They considered the formation of an internal opposition hopeless in view of the illicit majority the Bolsheviks could always command as long as the RILU sat in Moscow. It was futile to imagine that in such circumstances congress decisions would ever be determined "by a discussion on principles." Only the formation of an external opposition could preserve the independence of existing organizations and prevent a political faction from monopolizing the revolutionary labour movement.<sup>89</sup>

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Minority statements inevitably reflected these tactical disparities. A 'Manifesto to the Revolutionary Syndicalists of the World' explained that the opposition, forced into a minority by a defective system of representation, had been compelled to meet separately following the RILU congress. The signatories warned that the standing and effectiveness of the RILU could only diminish "if it remains under the influence of or subordinated to the Third International." It was therefore necessary to create an "organization of resistance" to be composed of elements "from within and for the moment from without" to struggle for the RILU's categorical independence from all political organizations. Although communist parties embodied loftier goals than the social democratic parties of the West, the syndicalists had encountered in Moscow the same political quest to exercise an "exclusive and indisputable hegemony" over the fighting organizations of the working class, a proclivity they dismissed as theoretically unjustifiable and practically disastrous. To counter it they sought to unite to defend within the RILU the fundamental interests of the working class against the encroachment of political parties. The manifesto directed the USI to coordinate relations between syndicalist organizations within and without the RILU, and to initiate preparations for a syndicalist conference. Signed by Mari, Relenk, Maurin, Severin, Barker, Williams and others, the equivocal document clearly attempted to appease both wings of the opposition.<sup>90</sup> A second 'Manifesto' advanced the startling claim that to defend their principles within the RILU the syndicalists had formed an 'Association of all the Revolutionary Syndicalist Elements of the World'. The Association purported to include the CNT, the USI, the CSR, the IWW, the SAC, the NAS, the FORA, as well as five German labour organizations, and groups in Denmark, Norway, Canada and Uruguay, representing 2,774,500 workers. The statement announced the election of a Bureau to sit in Paris charged with coordinating the communications, propaganda and conferences of the Association.<sup>91</sup>

In fact, however, the fragile unity of the opposition crumbled even before the delegates had left Moscow, and the purported Association never took form. Even the initial consensus concerning the need to publish a minority declaration following the congress soon dissolved. The resistance of the delegates from The Netherlands, Spain and Italy, to RILU policies had declined steadily. They eventually agreed that no opposition manifesto should be published, issuing instead a repudiation of the minority documents as incompatible with revolutionary unity. They pointed out that the support of the NAS for a syndicalist Association and its Bureau had been recorded without the consent of

the Dutch delegates, and that while the Italian and Spanish delegations had endorsed it in principle, they were now retracting their support. The counter-statement did not sanction the preparation of a syndicalist conference by the USI.<sup>92</sup>

The Bolsheviks obviously had reason to be pleased with these three delegations which, by the end of the congress, had become firm supporters of Moscow. Vecchi and Mari would return to Italy and launch a campaign to bring the USI into the RILU. Similarly, the Spanish delegates, with the exception of Leval, were transformed from critics of the RILU into steadfast proponents of the CNT's continued affiliation with Moscow. Before leaving Russia Arlandis declared that "we are syndicalists who have profited from the lessons of the war and of the Russian Revolution. We place ourselves within the framework of the general ideas of the Communist International." And Nin, later recalling the impact of their experiences in Moscow, noted that the CNT had earlier provided a "refuge" for him and Maurin, but once in Russia they were led to conclude that "so-called revolutionary Syndicalism" had become "obsolete in this century."<sup>93</sup> The Dutch delegates, faithful to their mandate, had actually voted against the Bolshevik RILU-CI resolution. In their report to the NAS, however, they claimed that the opposition had forced the Russians to make important concessions; that it had prevented the RILU from falling under the tutelage of the CI (though, apparently sensitive to the dubiety of this claim, they granted that the actual resolution could be interpreted differently). Emphasizing the danger that following the Moscow congress another trade union International might emerge, they added that a syndicalist International could not succeed since the USI, the CNT, and the CSR would not support it.<sup>94</sup> Although their mandate did not allow them to enroll the NAS in the RILU, they assured the RILU leadership before leaving Moscow that they would work energetically for such affiliation in Holland.<sup>95</sup>

Even with the more recalcitrant French delegation the Bolsheviks were able to secure a belated success. Some weeks after the congress closed officials of the RILU and the CI met with a number of the French delegates in an attempt to conciliate their differences. In the course of the meeting Sirolle, Gaudeaux, Gaye and Labonne, reaffirmed the necessity of syndical autonomy, but now advocated affiliation with the RILU and a policy of internal opposition. A document emanating from the meeting rejected syndical subordination, but acknowledged the need for coordinated action and recommended reciprocal representation in the governing organs of the two Internationals. As for the coordination of national communist parties and unions, the statement declared each

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country free to determine the most feasible procedure for this according to its own circumstances. Finally, it called upon the CSR to send delegates to the Central Committee and the Bureau of the RILU.<sup>96</sup> "The great problem of the congress," Rosmer privately reflected, "was the union between the syndicalists and the communists: otherwise there would have been no International. That union would have been realized in better circumstances if the French delegation had had another attitude, simply the attitude that they have now."<sup>97</sup>

The composition, procedures and distribution of votes in the RILU congress ensured the victory of Bolshevik policies. Although the Bolsheviks obviously preferred to describes congress decisions as the result of compromise, they had not been required to make a single major concession to the opposition. The structure of the congress, moreover, enabled the Bolsheviks to achieve their victory despite the ironic fact that the syndicalist and industrialist delegates alone represented mass revolutionary organizations outside Russia. Although even a united minority could not have overcome the built-in advantages the communist enjoyed in the congress, the Bolsheviks secured their success more readily in the face of an indecisive and fragmented opposition. Hope that the syndicalists and industrialists would unite to defend a common platform in the RILU congress proved largely groundless. True, certain organizations represented in Berlin - the SAC, the IWW, the FORA, even the NAS - refused to vote for the Rosmer-Mann resolution on RILU-CI relations in Moscow. But the objective of the Berlin conference to unify the syndicalists had not been realized. The minority agreed on the need to defend syndical autonomy, the chief issue in the congress, but disagreed on how autonomy should be interpreted and how it was best defended. A number of delegations chose to give to it an interpretation quite remote from that in the minds of the framers of the Berlin Declaration. To judge by the proceedings of the RILU congress, the confidence of the Bolsheviks that they had scored a great ideological and strategic victory over the syndicalists appeared well-warranted.

But the congress had in reality by no means resolved the long-delayed issue of Moscow's relations with the syndicalists. It had not laid the foundation, based on blueprints drawn up by the Bolsheviks, for syndicalist-communist relations. Instead, the decisions taken in Moscow in the summer of 1921 meant that the syndicalists' own judgments about Moscow-sponsored internationalism could no longer be deferred. A final judgment had been delayed initially from the success of the Bolshevik Revolution to the 'Red' year of 1919 and the formation of the Third International; postponed by the ambiguity of the early CI to its second

Congress in 1920, which imposed a new and distinctive form and substance upon the Comintern; deferred from 1920 to the formation of a separate revolutionary trade union International, the RILU, in 1921. The formal foundation of the RILU now demanded a decision from the syndicalists. Some of them, a minority, had taken a stand during this odyssey, but for most the day of judgment had been successively postponed. It could no longer be put off.

Rosmer's effort to deflect a debate on theoretical issues, to minimize ideological differences by characterizing the question of relations between the CI and the RILU as merely one of organizational form, could succeed only temporarily and only in the confines of a communist-dominated congress. For Rosmer concluded that the CI-RILU linkage was solely an issue of organization by proceeding syllogistically, in effect, from the major premise that if there were no significant theoretical differences between syndicalists and communists, the question of CI-RILU relations could only be one of organization. But his minor premise was fundamentally flawed, since profound theoretical differences survived between syndicalists and communists in the summer of 1921; they could not be explained away, however adroitly. By their very nature organizational issues form one of the most direct and immediate linkages, a chief nexus, between theory and practice. Where theoretical differences survive, to turn to organizational questions is not to bridge, but to provoke, heighten and sharpen those differences. It fell to the hapless Rosmer, an earnest revolutionary and sincere supporter of labour unity, not only to be the spokesman in the RILU congress for a resolution whose language he found needlessly provocative, but to undertake a task that by its very nature in the circumstances of 1921 could not, as he hoped, reconcile and unite. Behind Rosmer stood the Bolsheviks, who had already imposed the policies and organizational structure they wished upon the CI in 1920; who were in the summer of 1921 completing the subordination of the Communist Youth International to the CI, and of national youth bodies - now to accept hierarchical organization, centralized authority, thoroughgoing discipline - to national communist parties;<sup>98</sup> and who were simultaneously fashioning a trade union International on the same basis. For them no concessions to syndical independence were necessary in 1921; their decision in 1920 to construct a structurally separate International, rather than a mere trade union section of the CI, was concession enough. For the Bolsheviks the crucial decisions on trade union internationalism had been made and formalized; for the syndicalists they could not long be delayed.

The Bolshevik organization the summer of 1921 concession naturally dis they had n further wi point the of the RILU International unions, to draw th had taken for it. And been won to would not Godonnèch representat Tom Barke on RILU-C if the large virtually w to follow th But the v so well-foun the formati communist poned. The they had co only becaus Now, with one hand d organization - they had, provoked an